

It is important therefore to distinguish one from the other while recognising that until the distribution of seeds has been completed, both these projects will be closely interdependent.

In fact, it was thanks to the agricultural mission that the "seed" program was formed, set up, and its first results estimated. In return, the credibility of the development program increased in the eyes of the Kunar peasants as a result of this direct and greatly appreciated "palpable" assistance.

This is why throughout the entire mission, time was set aside for the implications of the seed program in the agricultural project. Working for the one in many ways helped give impetus to the other.

Thus, during the period from March 2 to April 6, the activities of the head of the mission consisted in both preparing the agricultural mission (contacts with Afghan interlocutors : commanders; protecting commanders; political parties; prospecting the bazaars, purchases ... etc.) as well as resuming the system of seed distribution which had gone dormant during the winter period.

As the distribution sites are situated near the border, fruitful contact occurred with the refugee population of the camps in the Bajaur region, 85% of which is originally from the Kunar.

It was also possible to meet a good number of distinguished persons and heads of local resistance which would have been difficult in the field : as each of them, when returning to Afghanistan, visits his own valley, meeting them would have required several days of travelling on foot.

A report cannot properly quantify and estimate the weight these discreet meetings and visits (clandestine) bore upon the development of the mission. They were indeniably useful, as they allowed us to provide information concerning our action and the way in which we could carry it out in agreement with the population.

## 2) Period from April 6 to May 18

Six weeks were then to elapse between the arrival of the three other members of the mission and the departure of team n°1.

Two main reasons for this delay :

- about ten days would normally have sufficed to gather the material and prepare it for the journey. There was word of a possible offensive in the Kunar, but not alarming enough to put off the departure and Walid Majrouh stated he was ready to convoy.

The purchase of material however, had to be interrupted for lack of funds as a result of delays in making contributions.

Nearly four weeks were thus lost, in fruitless waiting, a trying moment for the spirit of the team. The first payments allowing for the resumption of the mission arrived no sooner than May 6 (SCA).

- at about the same date, Walid Majrouh left Mr. Mujadedi's group and joined Mr. Gaylani's. This change of loyalty on the part of our protecting commander, in principle, was not to affect our association. Walid Majrouh claimed he was still willing to welcome us into the Kunar.

The political tendencies of both parties being very close, and their leaders convinced of the interest of our mission, nothing disturbed the relations we had, and still have, with Mr. Mujadedi's group. He understood quite well that maintaining our agreements with Walid Majrouh, if they were the result of mutual trust and sympathy based on past experiences of 1984 and 1985, was mostly tied to the work possibilities we were offered and to the interest in maintaining continuity in our introduction in the Kunari environment (without there being a political choice on our part).

Walid Majrouh's change of loyalty brought about many imponderables which he had to face, and was thus much less available. Also, while he proceeded with the necessary adjustments and the reorganisation of his group, the mission became of second importance to him. It was no doubt inevitable. As a result, team n°1 was not to depart until May 18.

During the week that preceded this departure, the La Hossein valley suffered bombardment. This area no longer seemed a wise choice to Walid Majrouh. Waiting for more ample information which could well question our right bank implantation, team n°2 had to once again exercise patience.

### 3) Period from May 18 to June 5

The information coming from La Hossein made it more and more unlikely that the second aspect of the mission would be set up in this valley. Heavy artillery shelling (orgues de Staline) was becoming frequent, indicating that the valley was under direct fire of the enemy. These sporadic bombings, although not very destructive (haphazard shots), gave reason to believe an operation was imminent in this sector.

Later we were to realize that the structures for our welcoming were not ready, and that despite what he had told us, Walid Majrouh was not really installed in La Hossein. He did not have enough men to guarantee our safety and our charge for a long time period.

This last consideration was preponderant in Walid Majrouh's decision to abandon our plan to set up in La Hossein. In fact the shelling became less frequent and the attack never occurred.

Now at last, the action on the right bank of the Kunar was greatly endangered as Walid Majrouh, since his withdrawal from the Shinkorak valley, no longer had an equipped base there.

The alternative we were offered was the Dangam valley on the left bank, half way south of the Orouz Bagh valley, where Bernard Juan and Henry Lopez were already established.

Walid Majrouh's recent adherence to Mr. Gaylani's group automatically gave him access to the markaz of this affiliation, much better represented in the Kunar sector than those of Mr. Mujadedi. This is why he was able to suggest to us one of the main resistance bases in Dangam, thus responding to the need of the mission for a site and protection.

Supposing Dangam could have served as an anchoring point for team n°2, contact between both teams would have been a problem. It became therefore necessary to revise our intervention plan. The initial plan to deploy the mission on both banks no longer seemed possible. The only solution left was to spread out on the only accessible bank : team n°1 would move further north (Sao Gue or Sao) so as to leave the southern part for team n°2. This possibility, for many reasons unsatisfactory, had to be discussed first of all with the team mates already installed.

The departure of group n°2 occurred on June 5. The caravan was joined by Oliver Calmet (journalist/photographer) and Dominique Bos (AFRANE member sent to the mission).

During this entire period, the Bernard Juan and Henry Lopez team, after arriving in Orouz Bagh and setting up there, began the foreseen work (market gardening and administering drugs to the livestock).

#### 4) Period from June 5 to June 20

Upon arrival in Dangam, it was clear that the site was unsuitable for the mission.

Governmental and Soviet troops had just failed in their attempt to implant a military post there.

Had they succeeded, this post would have given them dominance over half the valley and final control over the entire lower valley as far as the militia posts on the outskirts of Asmar. The higher valley would have been within reach of their artillery and two passes allowing direct access to the Kunar from Pakistan would have been unfeasible.

The fighting for this strategic spot lasted a week and had only ended three days earlier.

As a result, all civilian activity came to a halt in 3/4 of the valley, and the already very sparse population was now totally absent.

The atmosphere in the markaz where Walid Majrouh planned to set us up, was less concerned than ever before with agricultural matters, deemed incompatible by many of them with their dignity as fighters, now heightened.

From as early as the second day, both teams found themselves united in Orouz Bagh, while Walid Majrouh, on his way to Pakistan with his escort, appointed one of his lieutenants to "prospect" and find as soon as possible, a base for group n°2.

The attempts we made at finding a solution by way of the ties we had established the year before with the head commanders in the valley yielded no results. Abdol Rauf Mollah, the commander who had received us the preceding year and most likely to be able to help the mission unfold, was unfortunately absent from the valley.

After about ten days, in light of the accumulation of difficulties, team n°2's return to Pakistan was seriously considered.

That is when Walid Majrouh's lieutenant brought us commander Nour Mohammad's invitation to set up in his village, Mared, on the right bank of the Kunar, at the top of the Nishagam valley.

Leaving Oliver Calmet in Orouz Bagh, team n°2 crossed the Kunar on June 20 and arrived in Mared.

#### 5) Period from June 20 to July 27

During this period, and in each of the sites, both teams carried out the activities in the program without much difficulty.

#### Team n°1 - Left bank - Orouz Bagh/Shal

As the anti-parasitic treatment was administered to almost all the livestock in the Orouz Bagh valley, and the market garden sector no longer required sustained attention which was necessary during the sowing and dressing of the soil, it was decided to transfer a good part of these activities to Shal.

The team kept its base in Orouz Bagh, where Henry Lopez stayed on alone for some time.

As explained above (concerning the choice of work sites), the political climate in Shal had seriously evolved since 1985. Without talking about real tension, one can nonetheless say that the relations between the different markaz no longer had the simplicity that had allowed the exploratory mission to proceed without major problems.

In this new context, it became rapidly clear that the development work itself was losing ground as there was no minimum established population to keep it going.

During the first weeks of July, Henry Lopez's health, which was already a source of concern, worsened. All activity on the left bank was suspended and the team returned to Pakistan on July 11. Henry Lopez, upon arrival in Peshawar, had to be repatriated to France for medical reasons. Bernard Juan was to remain in Pakistan until the mission took new shape.

#### Team n°2 - Right bank - Mared

Upon its arrival in Mared, team n°2 met with a situation totally different from the one in Shal, and in many respects, considerably more favorable to a development endeavor.

#### Mared :

The Pashtun population is indeniably the one who, in the Kunar, have been hardest hit since the beginning of the war. Their location on the edge of the Kunar or in the

valleys on the left bank became an obstacle when the enemy decided to circulate freely on the trail leading to Barikot or to check the border.

Exodus in this case is quite understandable, especially considering the adjacent province in Pakistan is Pashtun territory.

In the region concerning us, several valleys on the right bank house Nuristani inhabitants. These people have also been the object of slaughter attacks, but their location in the far mountains kept them from the zone of conflict; to such an extent that Nuristani villages were still practically intact whereas the towns along the Kunar had been deserted and destroyed for 3 or 4 years. This situation was to continue until the Ramadan 1985 offensive which caused much destruction in these remote valleys relatively preserved until then.

Whereas the first waves of exodus (1982-1983) included very few Nuristanis, one could have expected that following the 1985 destruction many of them would seek exile (burning of the entire village of Helgal, destruction of half the village of Sucay, destruction of 5 houses in Mared). This was not the case however.

Rather than settling in some refugee camp in nearby Pakistan where their ethnic group would not be in the majority, the Nuristani inhabitants of these valleys preferred to remain in the immediate vicinity of their destroyed villages or after reconstruction, in the former sites.

The result is that the entire Nuristani sector in the zone of the project reveals a stable, coherent, and balanced population. They live as they used to, without modifying their habits, except for adjusting to the conditions of the war : difficulties in trade, autarky, protection of certain possessions, a more dispersed reconstruction of houses ... etc.. Its commitment to the Resistance was not broken, but as they remained basically farmers, a proliferation of the markaz, characterising the left bank, did not occur.

It is interesting to note that the markaz found on the right bank were set up along the territorial limits of both ethnic groups, and are under the main authority of Pashtun commanders, whose strongest and most operational forces are based on the left bank. The Nuristani in this sector provide these markaz with men and assistance in perfect harmony and collaboration. The big difference, at the level of these small garnisons, is that the Pashtun mujahed will (in 80% of the cases) return to Pakistan

after two months, and the Nuristanis will move a little higher in the valley (sometimes less than an hour's walk).

Thus, the Nuristani villages are practically not militarised (in appearance at any rate). If one political tendency or another becomes manifest in any given villager (in favor of the resistance of course!), it will not bear weight in the decisions taken by the council concerning community issues.

Mujahedin troops in the vicinity and their commanders can come spend several days in the village. They are always welcome by the supporters of the tendency they represent, but they have no say in the running of daily and customary activities.

Certain locally important commanders may have certain weight at the level of jirgahs (\*) but it will be more by virtue of their autochthonous origin and their belonging to the community (\*\*) than their politico-military label.

It is in this natural, stable, mainly rural environment therefore, that team n°2 set up.

As its arrival was unprepared - although it should have been in La Hossein - a few days of discussion with the population were necessary.

Nour Mohammad, our official host, was a "commander" only by right of honor, as he had no mujahed under his orders. In fact, he was one of the eminent persons in the village. His support of our arrival was followed by that of his equals, and after about ten days the whole village organised our welcome and wholeheartedly backed the project.

This brought about an entirely different practical organisation of the team, which was not included (as was team n°1) in the common day to day life of a markaz. It had to reconsider housing, food supply, domestic needs and its relations according to village customs.

As the population had not changed their habits much in relation to peace time, we had to deal with a lack

(\*) Jirgahs : village assemblies

(\*\*) Inter-ethnic marriages or alliances

of available "idle" men such as the mujahedin - between periods of combat - can be in their markaz. Thus, the activities undertaken had to be integrated into the rhythm of village matters, and each opportunity had to be grabbed (to be led to the livestock sites, to visit a field, to organise a discussion, to form an intervention team ...etc.).

This could appear to slow down the promptness of our action. In fact, it proved to be the best way to make it effective, as the peasants, occupied with their chores or daily habits, only participated if they deemed the goal to be useful, necessary, and profitable.

This context, so different from the one on the left bank, led team n°2, in its work, to stress the educational and training aspect of the project. Also, sectors of rural economy hardly practised until then took on importance : trade, crafts, the structure and methods of connections.

Jean-Pierre Filiu, sent to the site by the International Solidarities association, participating in financing the project, was to stay in Mared from July 15 to 28 ( see annexed report by Mr. Filiu ).

#### 6) Period from July 28 to August 7

This period in Pakistan responded to several imperatives :

- To replenish material and miscellaneous products necessary for the mission to continue.
- To begin the second phase of the "seed" operation by organising estimation methods and ways to inspect the results : team of Afghan inspectors were to join us and support us in the field; their program was to be established.
- As Michel Verron was in transit in Peshawar, a certain number of meetings and discussions were to take place with him.
- A few days of rest were necessary.
- To reorganise the mission following our withdrawal from the left bank.

This reorganisation was all the more timely considering Dominique Paris had become seriously ill during the short trip between Mared and Pakistan. As his condition did not improve during our trip to Peshawar, he was forced to return to France.

So the mission, reduced to one team, embarked for Mared again. It was composed of the two 1985 mission members : Bernard Juan and Alain de Bures.

Dominique Bos, sent to the BIA mission by AFRANE, took an interest in education during his first stay. As the project

to finance a school, requested by the population in Mared, was approved by his association, Mr. 'Bos returned for a second stay, in order to set up this structure and enable it to open the following spring.

#### 7) Period from August 7 to September 10

In this period, the activities begun during the first stay were continued : market gardening, phytosanitary endeavor, treatment of flocks ... etc.

Veterinary action was almost entirely dedicated to training certain villagers and getting them acquainted with the methods used. At the same time, the way in which the inhabitants of this valley could take charge of certain aspects of the activities undertaken, was becoming clear.

This period coincided with the neighboring population's awareness of our intervention, in which they took an interest. Intermediate villages sent delegations to make contact with the team. This was the case for the Gujurs as well. Thus, the groundwork was prepared this year for the expansion of the work done in Mared to neighboring communities. The type of intervention desired by the population was also established.

During the final weeks, a team of Medecins du Monde (Doctors of the Earth) was to carry out an exploratory mission in the Kunar. It was led by Bernard Kouchmer and Xavier Lenoir de la Cochetiere. This mission, based primarily on a vaccination program, touched the fringes of the zone covered by the agricultural project. The interest of concerted action between organisations, in activities so obviously complementary, became clear at this occasion. This responds to the desire expressed to this effect in the 1985 report.

The constant difficulties encountered by Walid Majrouh in ensuring our safety and convoying us during the length of our mission led the mission to decide to withdraw from Mared at the same time as the team from Medecins du Monde. Composed then, only of Dr. de la Cochetiere, the team also had some problems in being escorted. Our group, joined by the team of inspectors of the "seed" program made up a caravan offering some extra guarantees for a safe trip.

This decision taken only for security reasons however, reduced our stay in Mared by about fifteen days. In any event, the season no longer allowed many activities, as the corn was ripening and the flocks were returning from summer pastures which made them difficult to contact until the end of October. Moreover, as a result of the drugs

already administered, a certain number of people were now themselves able to continue with the treatments whenever the animals returned to their winter locations.

Another sign worth mentioning, of the inhabitants' ability in this sector to take charge of a number of activities, is the fact that one individual, designated by the village, was entrusted with all the material left behind by the three missions working in Mared this year ( AFRANE, MdM, BIA ).

The mission left Mared on September 10.

## INTRODUCTION

Emergency aid for the Afghan people is not sufficient in order to meet the needs resulting from seven years of war. Besides the natural limits of any prompt action, aid must be provided while respecting local traditions of production and distribution. These have been largely hampered by more than seven years of conflict.

The objective of the BIA, in agreement with the Resistance organisations and the peasants, is to assist in maintaining and developing agricultural and livestock production, so as to enable the rural population to stay on their land rather than swell the ranks of refugees, and as a result allow the Resistance to hold out. This has been the object of the action undertaken until now in the Kunar province.

In light of this, immediate action must be taken in the context of the war, in order to counter the risk of famine and malnutrition by striving for food self-sufficiency (which the Afghan people used to have despite low revenues). Direct aid (distributing selected and adapted wheat and corn seeds as well as vegetable seeds, utilising phyto-sanitary treatments, improving "management" of herds, veterinary care, anti-parasitic treatments, introducing certain elementary tools, etc.) facilitates the on site training of peasants and livestock breeders in the use of simple techniques which will enable them to make the best use of their own experience.

The training of local development agents, without which the missions we have undertaken would be meaningless, also prepares for the future, in the perspective of the country's liberation, which sooner or later must occur. The valorisation and diversification of the agricultural resources in this country, still basically rural, will contribute to ensuring its economic independence and satisfying the needs of its population.

The action undertaken corresponds therefore to a certain idea of aid to Afghanistan which emerged as early as 1984, during study sessions we had organised on the topic of nutrition in a wartime economy, with the participation of associations involved in aid to Afghanistan, but some of them also in development aid to other Third World countries. Following a preliminary mission that year, the BIA's agricultural project entered an experimental phase in 1985, and in 1986, in a more operational phase. This seems to confirm the merits of the guidelines we had established.

#### IV THE ANIMAL HUSBANDRY PROGRAM

##### A) The animals

The composition of the livestock, both large and small, the way the flocks are handled, their pathology, and their nourishment, were described in the 1985 report. It is necessary however, to specify certain aspects of stock breeding on the right bank.

##### Transhumance

Contrary to the left bank, where the herdsmen spend the summer on nearby land belonging to their tribe, the Gujur and Nuristani inhabitants of the right bank travel great distances into the mountains, about a four day walk, to pastures belonging to the people of Weygal or Porun. They also have areas there that have been reserved for them during generations, but they must pay the owners of these meadows a grazing tax : one goat for every twenty-five. Their stay lasts from May 15 to August 15. The return is progressive and the flocks begin to approach the villages no sooner than October/November depending on the harshness of the season.

##### Animal shelters

The sheep and goats are always kept on the outskirts of the village. Their shelter consists of a deep open shed encircled by a low wall or on the edge of a cliff. The family members responsible for the herd are installed in the "banda" halfway to the shed.

The cattle which are brought back to the village are kept in a cow shed located on the ground floor of the house. Animal shelters are built with the same care as houses. Very often, they are equipped with a door frame which can be closed off by a rod or a padlock.

##### Produce and income from herds

(See what was said above concerning cheese-making and improved marketting of livestock : elements of animal husbandry methods particular to this sector.)

## B) Mission activities

### 1) Left bank : Orouz Bagh - Shal

The policy of intervention in this sector was not to be very different from the preceding year. That is : through very precise action aimed at certain improvements (in this case to improve health conditions by systematic elimination of internal parasites), and supporting a long term campaign of education for the breeders. The objective being to improve the handling and management of the live-stock as well as training veterinary nurses.

From the start it was clear that we would not be able to carry out training activities with the potential personnel in the markaz. Walid Majrouh should have placed some young people at our disposal as he had done the preceding year. Absorbed by the political and military adjustments resulting from his change of party, he was unable to face up to this commitment. Moreover, the almost total militarisation of the left bank did not induce the commanders in these valleys to take a particular interest in agricultural matters. The mujahedin were more than ever unwilling to give up their valorising status of fighters ... even temporarily.

In the Orouz Bagh valley however, thanks to the still rural population, the action begun last year had been fruitful and encouraging.

Entirely convinced of the interest of our intervention, the stock breeders in Orouz Bagh very favorably welcomed team n°1.

At the instigation of Bernard Juan, especially in charge of the animal husbandry program on the left bank, several assemblies of stock breeders were held. That is how a work plan came into being. This is considerable progress as last year no "jirgah" could be organised to discuss stock breeding problems.

That is how the flocks from the different sectors of the valley were brought together on sites favorable to the handling of livestock. This considerably reduced having to go from one herd to another. Such extenuating procedures had been imposed upon us last year by the breeders, out of suspicion towards our initiatives and unaware of how they could benefit from them. This was compounded by individualism and a closed family unit, of which the herd is an extension. There is obvious reluctance toward poening up ... especially to neighbors.

Administering shots brought the breeders together on one site where they helped each other accomplish their job. It was innovating. True, in Afghanistan similar collective endeavors exist (anything related to irrigation, for example). But the herd, especially in these very secluded regions, is something very personal with which no foreigner is to interfere. The meetings held in Crouz Bagh led to the establishment of the program, but more importantly they enabled the locals to overcome their suspicion and mistrust and consider animal husbandry in their valley as something involving all the livestock there, rather than just their own herd.

From a technical point of view, the program required the participation of the breeders because they were the ones to establish the procedures.

Afterwards, the treatment, counting, and handling of the herds by those who were not its owners, gave rise to a number of considerations (the condition of the animals, the number of males, of sterile females ... ) elements of discussion very favorable to the development of more coherent stock breeding practices.

Small livestock was also taken into account this year. Treatment was given to the fowl, suffering from coryza and New Castle disease. Fowl breeding is of noteworthy importance and team n°1 attempted to revive it especially in the markaz and in areas deserted by families where the men, who have stayed on alone, have tended to overexploit the fowl to the point of making it disappear.

About one hundred chicks were brought from Pakistan for this endeavor. The interruption of the mission in this area of the Kunar did not allow to go further towards the objective of a more controlled chicken farming. The chicken roam about as they please.

Treatment was to begin in Shal when the team was forced to return to Pakistan.

## 2) Right bank : Mared - Sucay

In its sector, team n°2 also encountered problems such as a lack of personnel to train, and what is even paradoxical for an area where there is greater animal husbandry than on the left bank, is the lack of animals to be administered shots.

True, the immediate surroundings of the valleys were not void of herds, but the mission had to deal with a population

unprepared for this kind of initiative and we had no commander to introduce us. As Abdul Rauf Mollah did in 1985, we had to persuade the breeders to show us their herds.

This was not very difficult in Mared. Unfortunately the animals in this village were in remote areas of transhumance. Several reasons led to discarding the idea of treating these flocks on site :

- Lack of availability of the population, occupied with agricultural work, to take us to the mountain pastures and organise the transporting of material (a 4 day walk).

- Lack of time to effectively carry out the work there without neglecting what needed to be done in the valley, a key element of our introduction to the village environment.

- The inevitable encounter with herds from all the surrounding regions in the summer pasture lands. We would not have been able to meet demand and it was unthinkable to segregate and treat only the Mared/Sucay animals.

The team thus administered shots to the flocks remaining nearby. This was done according to the requests we received from the owners, mostly Gujurs or Pashtuns. The result was a fairly chaotic and uneven campaign based on opportunities. A ridiculous number of animals was treated (considering the livestock in the region), but the objective in fact, was not so much an immediate effect on the health of the animals, but rather to be seen in action in all parts of the valley, and to let the word spread.

This "publicity" work was greatly facilitated by a providential inhabitant of Sucay. Abdel Wahab, the inn keeper, quickly became a valuable partner as he had been a student at the school of agriculture in Herat and received training in stock breeding techniques. This is particularly remarkable considering Abdel Wahab is Gujur. As such, he obviously owned animals, and those he had on site were the first to be treated.

A small group of villagers was formed in Mared willing to collaborate with us. During the final month, these inhabitants, concerned that we would leave without their livestock being injected, requested to be trained to do it themselves. This was done, and the obstacle keeping us from treating the bulk of the herds was thus overcome. When the mission left, four people, capable of applying the treatments, received a stock of product for about

15,000 head of small livestock and 1000 cattle, as well as the material necessary to administer it. Representatives of the village signed a receipt and took on the responsibility of properly carrying out this task.

Thus, the animals will be treated upon their return from summer pastures, which is precisely the time period that these treatments yield optimum results.

The 1987 mission will evaluate the way in which these injections were administered. Proof has however been ample, as seen in the phytosanitary treatments, that the Mared inhabitants are quite capable of organising and carrying out such operations, and even keeping a daily record.

During this campaign, the sheep were also injected. They are much more numerous than in Shal and more wisely used than on the left bank. All the cattle present were also administered shots.

Additional data :

#### Orouz Bagh

Animals treated	Small livestock : 2614
	Cattle : 92

Number of families involved : 47

Average size of herd : 55 head

This can be considered the whole of the livestock in the valley. In 1985, only 1388 animals were injected, and 20 families involved.

The improved health of the animals treated in 1985 unquestionably played a role in obtaining the support of the population during the 1986 campaign. The assemblies held succeeded in doing away with the remaining reticence.

This unanimous agreement and the echo it received in the neighboring villages led certain commanders to more closely consider this type of action and regret that the livestock in their sector was not treated. (These regrets came mainly from the Shal and Dangam valleys).

Faced with the difficulties that limited our intervention and with their own responsibility in this matter, some of

these commanders asked how they could participate in and facilitate the treatment campaigns next year. It is in light of these new dispositions on the part of the officials on the left bank, that the 1987 program to administer shots will be elaborated for this bank of the Kunar.

Mared/Sucay

Animals treated	Small livestock :	600
	Cattle :	92
	Donkeys :	62

These treatments, administered in the conditions stated above, allowed 132 families to become aware of this type of action.

As the bulk of the livestock was not within reach during the time we were there, some of these stock breeders requested training which would enable them to inject the animals upon their return in October/November.

The figures listed only reflect the livestock present, the one used for this training.

## V THE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

The agricultural situation in the Kunar, regardless of which bank, is no different from what was described in the 1985 report.

As additional information we can add the figures concerning cultivation typical to high valleys (data gathered by team n°2 in Orouz Bagh and during the visits necessary in estimating the results of the grain production assistance program).

Average surface area cultivated : 0.9 to 1 ha.  
Surface area of terraces : 50 to 500 m<sup>2</sup>

End of spring harvest :

Barley : 30 to 40% of surface area  
Wheat : 60 to 70% " " "  
Rapeseed, vegetables, clover (episodic)

Fall harvest :

Corn : 70 to 90% of surface area

Yield :

Barley : 3 to 4 quintals/ha  
Wheat : 6 to 9 quintals/ha  
Corn : 13 to 17 quintals/ha (maximum 20)  
(from locally produced seeds)

Livestock :

25 to 55 goats (15 to 39 mothers)  
0 to 5 sheep  
Litter : 50 to 60% ( a favorable year)  
1 to 2 milk cows (milk peak : 3 liters)\*  
2 work oxen  
1 donkey (optional)  
5 to 10 chickens  
1 dog

Material :

1 scratch plough + yoke  
1 levelling board (drawn)  
1 rake/harrow to lift the border levees  
1 or 2 wooden "shovel/spatula" or 1 iron shovel (rare)  
ax, pruning knives, baskets, rope.

\* 1 milk peak : an average of 35 liters for a European cow.

Note that average wheat production for one farm stands at around 750 kg.

Approximately 2 kg of flour are needed per day for a family of five adults. With the additions, the guests, the helpers, etc., a ton of flour is needed for the year, or 1300 kg of wheat.

It is easy to understand how important cornbread is when there is no more wheat. Now the land used for wheat, because of its low location, is the most exposed to the enemy's destruction. Corn thus becomes the most important grain.

#### 1) Mission activities

Like the preceding year, the teams attempted to promote the implantation of gardens wherever they were not customary, and to accelerate the process of popularization resulting from our 1985 action.

This year however, the other aspects of local agriculture had to be considered. That is what was done with the grain production assistance program (see annex for specific report on this action) and by introducing, on both the left and right banks, new productions and techniques wherever possible.

#### 2) Orouz Bagh and the left bank

Henry Lopez was particularly in charge of this program.

In early spring, while the distribution of grain seed was taking place, the relations we had had with the commanders we met in Shal the preceding year, were renewed. Although they had saved the seeds we had given them then, and had not yet planted them, the quantities they had were not sufficient. They asked that their stock be completed so they could begin planting in their valleys as early as possible, without having to wait for us to arrive there.

Those who made this request each received a lot of about 2kg of assorted vegetable seeds (or for a little less than 1 ha. of garden). Nine commanders received these lots. In most cases the seeds served to set up or to replant gardens used by the markaz. The families in the vicinity also received some from their respective commanders. We must note however, that most family gardens were not cared for, as the families who had shown an interest in gardening last year had either gone into exile or were about to do so.

During the distribution, which we ourselves carried out on site, emphasis was placed, in relation to the commanders and eminent persons in the zones where we had not intervened last year, on the request from the commanders in Shal and on the advantages they would get from participating in our widespread action.

Thus, in the Orouz Bagh valley, the forty-seven families represented were recipients of the distribution done by team n°1, as well as the commanders of the seven markaz present in the valley.

This corresponds to :

2	kg	of	watermelon	seeds
1	"	"	carrot	"
0.8	"	"	eggplant	"
2	"	"	cauliflower	"
1	"	"	tomato	"
2	"	"	radish	"
1	"	"	beetroot	"
2	"	"	onion	"
3	"	"	turnip	"
1.6	"	"	melon	"
1.6	"	"	cucumber	"
1.6	"	"	green cabbage	"
3.5	"	"	pumpkin	"
2	"	"	zucchini	"
3	"	"	okra	"
3	"	"	chick peas	

Or enough to cover a surface area of about 3 ha. (considering wastage).

Many of these varieties should have been planted earlier. As was done in Shal last year, the recipients were advised to save the seeds for next spring.

In Orouz Bagh, a model garden was created directly adjacent to the residence area of Henry Lopez. He was thus able to supervise the setting up and the work involved, as well as plan varieties not well known in the region : green cabbage, radishes, chick peas, beetroot, carrots ... Total surface area : 500 m<sup>2</sup>.

Also, planting seeds under black vinyl film was successfully experimented.

This extremely simple technique allows to cut down on watering (by reducing vaporization) and soil maintenance activities such as hoeing and weeding (as the ground is covered). This responds to several important considerations:

- A less demanding "watering rota" time table for

grain crops.

- The varying water resources often reduced by periodic droughts (as in 1985).

- The lack of manpower for the relative persistence of soil upkeep (in exodus areas).

Moreover, the ground, now covered, retains heat as well as humidity. This enables those varieties planted late to catch up.

Parallel to this garden activity, a special effort was made to popularize the planting of potatoes.

In the Kunar valleys, it is generally believed that this tuber can only be grown in "cold lands", that is, very high in the forest zone, far from permanent dwellings. Even so, it is rare to find.

During the mission, fifty kilos of potatoes brought from Bajaur (an unquestionably "warm" land).

They had not yet been harvested when the mission left. The result should provide the potatoes necessary for the extension of this production in 1987. Surface area planted : 250 m<sup>2</sup>.

NE : This is an example of the kind of action that can only be undertaken by someone foreign to the community, unrestrained by habits or beliefs that everyone accepts without ever putting them to question.

### 3) Mared

Market gardening

As in Orouz Bagh, team n°2 distributed the vegetable seeds to each and every family in Mared, 35 families in Sucay, and 8 families in Helgal.

The delay in our arriving in this sector led us to distribute only those varieties which could still be planted in time. That is :

2	kg	of	green	cabbage	seeds
3	"	"	onion	seeds	(for the production of
				seedlings	to be transplanted in spring)
5	"	"	turnip	seeds	( white and pink)
2	"	"	pumpkin	"	
2	"	"	cucumber	"	
11	"	"	white	beans	

For example, the unprecedented and spontaneous meetings held by livestock breeders in Mared, on the right bank of the Kunar, to discuss questions raised by our technicians on how to improve the quality and "yield" of herds, or the village assemblies appointing "representatives" who, with our help have acquired certain training, bear witness to the interest shown by the peasants in a given sector to initiatives they deem useful and profitable. It is also proof of the need for permanent dialogue, in a spirit of partnership, with the population involved and the Resistance organisations representing them. Continuous and regular contact with local Resistance commanders and of course with the Islamic Alliance of Mujahedin to which they are affiliated through the main parties, despite the complexity and changeability of situations, is indispensable in designing and carrying out action in the field.

In 1986, the mission, made up of two teams, Alain de Bures, head of the mission, Bernard Juan (two 1985 team mates), Henri Lopez, and Dominique Paris, encountered certain difficulties related to war developments. This is true for the depopulation of new areas, as a result of bombings : the departure of civilians, and thus a very small settled population, destroys all possibilities of agricultural activity, and can, in turn, cause soil erosion which in a hypothetical and distant future will undermine the normal resumption of agriculture in such areas. Another example of the problems encountered : whereas certain commanders have shown determined interest, others disregard agricultural matters as they are exclusively concerned with the purely military aspects of the war. These must be made aware of their responsibilities as representatives of a multifaceted Resistance, one that is not only made up of warriors.

These realities led the mission to develop a methodology, a way to diversify the action to be carried out which would take into account the difficult aspects of the Afghan rural world, according to circumstances and sectors. So in certain areas a kind of "maintenance" seemed more appropriate or even conceivable, rather than a true development endeavor better adapted to other sectors.

The action carried out in 1986 only confirmed the need we had already expressed at the end of the 1985 mission : reincorporating agricultural aid in the broader context of a rural economy, which means that aid to agriculture and animal husbandry can only be designed in light of existing commercial networks, prices, and the motivation of farmers to produce one thing instead of another. Aid provided in the case of certain roads (the restoration of a bridge), the support of local craftsmen who can produce or repair certain agricultural material, the installation of a school,

The inhabitants in this sector (Nuristani) already practised gardening and every family had a parcel reserved for this thanks to locally produced seeds of largely undiversified varieties (tomatoes, squash, red peppers, okra).

It was difficult to remedy a fairly anarchical technique of sowing and planting in the already existing vegetable gardens. This could only be done with the late varieties that we brought.

Two demonstration vegetable gardens served to support our cultivation suggestions : green cabbage (unknown until then), pumpkin, and turnips represented the bulk of our crops for winter consumption (or 500 m<sup>2</sup>).

It was too late to launch a potato crop, as was done on the left bank, but the idea was well received and already, a field located in the middle of the village has been reserved for this crop next year.

As a substitute, emphasis was placed on beans.

Beans constitute a very important element of nutrition in the Kunar during the winter, as it is the only source of non animal protein. The local red, climbing variety is planted on the edge of corn fields at the same time as the corn. Cultivation and harvest conditions are such, that a good part of this production is lost. Moreover, each plant produces no more than about ten pods (from 100 to 120 gr. per plant).

Thus, about two kilos of the coco variety (white and non climbing) were planted in a demonstration parcel : 50 m<sup>2</sup>, while the rest was distributed to the population in Mared (exclusively).

Sample survey harvests have shown productivity to be from 500 to 800 gr. per plant ( about 5 to 8 times greater than the local variety) without any major modification in cultivation methods (except it is exclusive in the parcel).

The village council, very impressed by this result, has taken charge of the demonstration field which is already reserved for the production of seeds to be distributed to the population by the council, after harvest (late September).

The request for such seeds by the representatives of nearby villages is proof of the interest aroused, and in a way guarantees that this harvest will indeed be reserved for planting.

#### 4) Phytosanitary effort

We realized last year that the protection of plants was also an area of immediate concern. This was to be confirmed in Mared this year.

The mission had to intervene in the corn and bean crops to halt three kinds of devastators :

Noctuid : A moth caterpillar which remains underground during the day and at night gnaws the collar of young plants (especially corn). The damage caused by them can result in a 50% loss of certain crops.

: A kind of tiny butterfly which, as both adult and larva, attacks the underside of leaves, causing vast hardened areas which considerably slow down growth (corn).

Bug : About the size of a pinhead, they particularly infest the bean plants at the 2 leaf stage, completely stopping the growth of the plants which dry up afterwards.

Flooding the parcels for several hours yielded excellent results in the case of noctuids. This very easy to use technique is also quite adapted to the resources in the areas where there is much water.

As for the other insects, a synthetic purethrenoid (with the same properties as a plant insecticide) was tested which is fairly easy to use. The fact it is not very residual makes it safe for the users in the Third World and the insects do not build up a resistance to it.

These tests were conclusive and the village community very easily acquired the technique.

In order to begin treatment of all the crops, it was decided that the necessary quantity of this product (Ripcord) would be brought from Pakistan.

The community met to discuss this issue and appointed someone responsible for the purchase, who would also transport and convoy it himself. We provided him with the address of the retailer, a sample, and the money.

Despite the difficulties encountered during this mission which was a new experience for him and his community, the boy succeeded quite well and returned with the product in the allotted time.

Three villagers, also appointed by the assembly, were trained to operate (Chinese) hand sprayers, and instructed on how much product to use. They were the ones who took over the spraying campaign. They acted as monitors with the peasants, following them closely at first, ensuring the correct use of the material and the product, being very strict towards attempts to misappropriate the product, watching over the upkeep of the material ...etc.

Upon returning to the village in the evening, they would give an account of the day's work to a literate member of the group, so as to keep a journal of the campaign : date, number of fields treated, names of beneficiaries, named places, and amount of product used.

Priority was given to the most affected fields (always determined by the council), and then the entire valley from top to bottom, was systematically treated, as well as certain bordering fields in Sucay.

From 70 to 75 ha were treated.

This campaign was carried out so seriously (without us playing any other role than providing them with the means) that the team decided to trust the people in Mared with the veterinary treatments.

### 5) Equipment

An assortment of agricultural equipment, manufactured according to Henry Lopez's instructions, in the school workshop of the Austrian Relief Committee in Peshawar, was brought to both banks : spade shovel, hoe, three pronged pickaxe, garden hoe.

These tools were forged in the simplest fashion so as to be easily copied by local blacksmiths. They had a varying success with the peasants. The pickaxe was their favorite, then the garden hoe. The hoe and spade shovel left them indifferent. The absence of blacksmiths on the left bank creates a sizeable obstacle to popularizing them in this sector. In Mared, it will depend on whether or not the craftsmen are given incentives (orders from us, improvement of smith equipment ...).

Two hand seeders arrived during the month of July.

This shipment, by the "Committee for aid to the farmers in the Kunar" is in line with our idea of popularizing seed drilling (economising seeds, facility in dressing the soil, better distribution of irrigation systems, etc.).

These were in fact seeder-wheelbarrows, pushed along by the farmer, and the wheel of which triggered the programmed opening of a hopper : each seed falling at regular intervals behind a mini-ploughshare.

Although the design is fairly simple, it seems quite unlikely that this kind of tool can be reproduced by local craftsmen. As these seeders arrived after the corn had been sown, they were not used. Next year however, they will be used in the demonstration parcels. We feel it would be desirable to use another kind of seeder in the future.

## VI ASSOCIATED ACTION

On both banks

As in the preceding year, dwellings were disinfected and rid of parasites.

Obviously, the spraying of insecticide could improve the situation. It was very temporary however, as it is very difficult to get the housewives to thoroughly sweep the rooms in the house. Moreover, as men, we had no way of speaking with them.

### A) Mared

As the population has preserved their lifestyle, it is no surprise that craftwork has been maintained in the valley.

Woodworking is a Nuristani specialty.

Two carpenters live in Mared. They clearly lacked equipment. They were both supplied with the following:

- 1 set of borers (4 models)
- 1 jointer
- 1 plane
- 2 saws
- 1 sharpening stone
- 1 set of wood cutters (4 items)
- 2 graters

The village blacksmith received :

- 1 vice
- 2 tongs
- 1 metal saw
- 1 set of cold chisels
- 1 hand drill + bits
- 1 set of files

This material was provided only after it was clear that these craftsmen work basically to satisfy the needs of the community.

A similar request came from several other people. It concerned sewing material (sewing machine, thread, needles). Since it was difficult to distinguish whether these were craftsmen or just individuals, we were compelled to put off this assistance until 1987.

### B) The bridge over the Kunar

This bridge, destroyed in 1980, was rebuilt in 1983 (the BIA team was to cross it on their return trip in 1984). Destroyed once again during the 1985 offensive, the population undertook its reconstruction. The team in Mared was contacted by those organising this work, and decided to contribute 5000rupees. In the framework of a general collection, this assistance is purposely modest so as not to paralyse the general movement of financial and in kind contributions. Of course, a second payment is foreseen if necessary, once the work is truly under way, but the organisers were not informed of this.

### C) The school in Mared

Dominique Bos, assistant to the BIA team as an observer and in order to make contact with the Afghan rural environment, a member of AFRANE, was to stay on site for the entire duration of the mission.

The population, concerned by the absence of schooling for their children, requested assistance from us in this area. As this kind of aid is more appropriate to the type of action carried out by AFRANE, Dominique Bos established the form. This project got under way as early as August with the arrival of pedagogical material (books, notebooks, blackboard...) The village was to take charge of the construction of the building. This program concerns a little more than 60 students for the first two years of primary education as designed for the children in the refugee camps in Pakistan (program established by the Belgian committee's "Teacher Training for Afghan Refugees").

## VII CONCLUSION

### A) Summary of actions

#### 1) Agricultural program (except grain program).

Market gardens : distribution of vegetable seeds.

7 ha Shal  
9 ha Orouz Bagh

Demonstration gardens : sowing, irrigation, dressing the soil.

500 m<sup>2</sup> vegetables - Orouz Bagh  
250 m<sup>2</sup> potatoes - Orouz Bagh  
450 m<sup>2</sup> vegetables, split in two gardens - Mared  
50 m<sup>2</sup> beans - Mared

Phytosanitary treatments :

75 ha corn and beans - Mared  
Training of a team to popularize the spraying technique :  
3 persons .

Providing small agricultural material, equipment, seeders, spray pumps.

#### 2) Veterinary program

Eradication of livestock internal parasites :

Animals treated on both banks :  
small livestock : 3214  
cattle : 184  
donkeys : 62

Training a team to administer shots : 4 persons having received the material and the product necessary to treat 150,000 head of small livestock - 1000 cattle.

Fowl :

- shipment of 50 pullet hens to Orouz Bagh
- treatment of sick adult fowl : 25 interventions in Mared
- product left to the team administering shots

#### 3) Miscellaneous

Participation in the reconstruction of a bridge over the Kunar.

Disinfection of houses and cowsheds - Orouz Bagh - Mared.

## B) Principle lessons

1) The main principle of the project is to provide direct assistance (seeds, medicine, phytosanitary products, equipment ...) so as to support a more in depth movement with lasting effects on education and development.

This first effective year of the agricultural economy assistance program in the Kunar seems to entirely correspond to the guidelines we had set for ourselves and which were defined at the end of the 1985 preliminary mission. In fact, those who, especially in Mared received basic training are now capable of carrying out certain phytosanitary treatments. A relatively modest number of them (7) were trained, but this is not as important as the fact that they were representing their valley and had been designated by the village assemblies.

We never participated in any of these assemblies. They were held spontaneously, to discuss a pressing issue that we had raised a few days or even a few hours earlier.

This reaction on the part of the population clearly shows that as far as the right bank is concerned, the project made a wise choice and truly corresponds to a need and a demand.

It can thus, as we formulated it at the start, bear the expected fruit. This provided future events do not totally upturn the situation.

2) The same is not true for the left bank. In increasing our knowledge of the region we discovered how radically different one bank of the Kunar is from the other.

Despite the small area of Orouz Bagh, which can give rise to the illusion that a still viable foundation exists similar to what we found last year in Shal, we have to be clear and admit that the project, as it has been designed, is no longer suited to the prevailing situation on the left bank.

For this area, it must be redesigned, not so much in a development perspective, but rather to maintain and safeguard what still exists there.

Three objectives should serve as guidelines :

- Maintaining the crops and herds for the subsistence of resistance groups, the men of which, strictly fighters, today make up the majority of the population in the left bank valleys.

- Maintaining the crops, which allow for the upkeep of the fields, the retaining walls of parcels, the irrigation systems, thus avoiding their rapid and irreversible destruction as a result of erosion, making it impossible for families to return to their land after peace is established.

- Maintaining the crops and herds so these valleys can yield a minimum of resources. Sold to the mujahedin groups, the harvests and animals presently allow many refugee families in Pakistan to live better in the Bajaur camps where food aid is decreasing from one year to the next.

3) A methodology was thus developed in light of the different kinds of assistance provided to the Afghan rural environment. Areas where the population has remained and those where they have left are intermingled throughout the country.

The Kunar gives us a small scale idea of this.

This lesson should enable us to fine tune and line up our activities in the framework of the present project as well as in those that we wish to promote in other regions as soon as possible.

Agricultural, the BIA project could also be called "Assistance to the Development of Rural Economies Program", since the areas that it covers often go beyond simple production (fields and herds). Already, in the conclusion of the 1985 report, we wished for other kinds of aid to be included in an integrated program, in which the agricultural program would only be one element.

It is, in a way, what is already being set up. The school, sponsored by AFRANE, is a step in this direction, as is the medical program that "Medecins du Monde" are trying to get under way, using the structures of the project and letting the German Komite nurses take charge of basic health care.

Each of these organisations (keeping its autonomy and making use of its own capabilities) through the in depth work done at the level of the population and the economy of the villages, finds the ideal and indispensable support for its activities.

It is through this concertation that real in depth work becomes possible because the development of one region cannot be successful if any of the interrelated factors of the society are disregarded.

## VIII FUTURE PROSPECTS

### A) On the left bank

The very particular conditions that characterise the left bank make the presence of a team of western technicians no longer desirable.

In the prospect of maintaining what still exists, the valleys will receive distributions of both vegetable and grain seeds. The major commanders have apparently understood the benefits they can get from our initiatives. The withdrawal of team n°1 was not taken lightly by them. That is why, considering their willingness, they will be given charge of organising these distributions in their respective sectors. Our proximity on the right bank, and the trips we will be compelled to make to the left bank, will enable us to closely observed and assess the results.

As for stock breeding :

Whereas the population in Mared seriously and successfully participated in the training program, the situation on the left bank was quite different.

The commanders were either indifferent or, in the case of those aware of the benefits of the treatments, took advantage of the "services" we provided, and in no way participated nor did they send young people likely to be trained, as had been agreed.

The stock breeders in their valleys presently request and insist on the administering of shots. In the absence of technicians, it will not be possible to carry out the treatments and it can be expected that the shepherds will manifest their concern to the mission.

It will then be suggested once again to the officials of the resistance, that we be sent young people who, after becoming familiar with the techniques, will return at the end of the season in order to carry out the treatments in their valley of origin.

This procedure, both in the area of agriculture and animal husbandry, should make the major commanders aware of the responsibilities which they tend to dodge. This is all the more necessary considering they are the only ones who can launch an endeavor on the left bank and nothing can be carried out there without some participation from them.

the establishment of a medical care program, are activities undertaken in the Kunar with other associations and in relation to our agricultural aid, which can lay the groundwork for an integrated program. Agricultural aid becomes only one aspect, nonetheless essential, of a more global rural economy development strategy.

As we likewise stated at the end of 1985, the initial achievements in the Kunar are both microscopic and yet the seeds for the future. Officials from the Resistance movements in other regions have confirmed their interest in this kind of undertaking. The preliminary missions we intend to carry out in 1987 will respond to an ever increasing expectation. They will also allow us, through a better understanding of the Afghan rural world, to fine tune our operation in the Kunar which is to continue for at least another five years.

For the BIA

Jean-Paul Gay

### B) On the right bank

Two technicians will be set up in Mared, which becomes the homebase of the project.

Since integrating with the population and adopting the principle options of the program have been achieved in this village and its surroundings, we will now focus on accomplishing this in neighboring localities : Helgal and Sucay, already aware of our initiatives, all the way to the banks of the Kunar in the Nishagam area.

The activities described in this report will be resumed.

Our work however, would be incomplete without an intervention on the summer routes, be it only to better understand all aspects of local economic activity and the links with the hinterland which keep it going.

The possibility of a third technician is planned so as to carry out a campaign of administering shots in more remote areas, and thus would not be solely reserved for the livestock in the Mared/Sucay/Helgal region. It is during this campaign (in June-July) that the "students" we will request from the commanders on the left bank would receive their initial training.

Lastly, starting in January 1987, contacts will be established in Peshawar so as to take a census of the Afghan technicians likely to participate in the project as counterparts at first, then as full fledged officials replacing the western technicians.

### C) Notice concerning the grain production assistance program

This program will be renewed for spring 1987 with the participation of institutions that adhered in 1985. It is expected to provide all in all 100 tons of seeds (wheat and corn).

We will then be able to consider this region as being almost regenerated and likely to provide its own suitable seeds from its own harvests, for two years.

It is the promptness of this action the reason it is considered to be quite different from the present project which has been programmed for a period of five consecutive years.

D) Notice concerning safety conditions

All along the 1985 mission, the teams had to adjust to the protecting commander's constant breach of (oral) agreements concerning our safety.

It seemed necessary to write up a protocol explicitly stating mutual commitments that tie the protecting commander and the mission. This contract should make the relations official and should it not be respected, the mission could be called into question, either temporarily or permanently (see text in annexed section).

Alain de BURES

Paris, February 1 1987 - B.I.A.

-A N N E X E S-

page 43 : Border

Trail

Project limits

Important village

page 44 : ETHNIC GROUPS AND TRANSHUMANCE TRENDS IN THE KUNAR

Border

Trail

Winter

Summer

Important village

DIRECTION OF TRANSHUMANCE

## ANNEX II

Description of the Orouz Bagh and Mared valleys1) Orouz Bagh

The climatic, geographic, and ethnic traits of this valley are no different from those in neighboring Shal. Also, the flora, the kinds and ways of cultivating, the livestock, the habitat, the resources, and trade there, were described in the 1985 mission report.

Only its topography is different. It is very narrow and much shorter than its neighbors to the south and north (6 km), its banks are very steep and the slopes are generally sharp. The wide-mouthed part of the valley, towards the Kunar, used to provide nearly 60% of the arable land. Unfortunately, as in the case of Shal and Dangam, this extremely unsafe zone is no longer used.

The sector presently inhabited (upper 2/3) offers very little agricultural space and does not lend itself (as does Shal, at the same level) to the formation of hamlets. Two or three farms here and there are the only groupings, as for the rest, dwellings are sparsely scattered about and often on excessively steep land difficult to access.

In relation to the extreme harshness of the environment, the population was never great in Orouz Bagh. Before the war this valley was the home for hardly fifty families (or about 300 inhabitants). The exodus, as throughout the rest of the left bank, was considerable (100% in the lower land). Most families, whose farms were in the upper valley however, feeling protected by the rugged terrain, remained represented by one or several members of the family, or the entire family itself. This comes out to about 30% of the original population (as compared with the less than 10% in the other valleys of the left bank). According to the census carried out by team n°1, 47 families are thus represented. In addition, there are the changing shifts of mujahedin stationed in the markaz.

Thus, Orouz Bagh is presently the best inhabited valley on the left bank (between 150 and 200 people depending on the season), and though the majority are men, the population is composed of all age groups of both sexes. This makes it a favorable environment for a development endeavor.

As explained earlier (page 7), the relative hegemony of one party gives Orouz Bagh the political stability that no longer exists in neighboring valleys. Of the 8 markaz implanted

there, the four largest are of the same tendency and respect the authority of a commander of a markaz of different loyalty by virtue of his being a traditionally eminent person. The other posts do not have enough permanent men to really have any influence over the "spirit" of the valley, and act in line with the dominant groups.

Orouz Bagh, located between the Shal and Dangam valleys, is well outside of the passage routes, the main one of which runs through the Sao valley, north of Shal.

Team n°1 occupied a room in the house of commander Mahmad Hossein (Gaylani), which had been turned into a markaz ever since his family left for Pakistan. There are about six men permanently present there and agricultural activities are maintained, either to meet the needs of the group or to provide additional resources for the commander's family in Pakistan (sale of wheat, rapeseed).

## 2) Mared

The village of Mared is situated at the top of a valley on the right bank at the other end of which is the town of Nishagam. This valley cannot be described in a general fashion as was the Shal valley (1985 report) or Orouz Bagh in the present report, as it is full of particular traits.

This is why we have decided to give a detailed description of the valley's characteristics, particularly because it may become the center of the Kunar project and a spring-board for future action.

### a) Geographical position

On a Northwest/Southeast axis, the Nishagam valley is formed by the junction of two torrents : the Helgal torrent to the north, and the Mared torrent to the south. The Nishagam valley itself does not surpass 6 km, whereas the torrents are 25 km for Helgal and 23 km for Mared.

The large town of Nishagam is situated at an altitude of 900 m, at the confluence with the Kunar, whereas the highest pastoral dwellings on either of the two tributaries may be at 3250m. The passes leading the way to the Weygal/Pesh valleys are at about 3500 m. The summits exceed 4000 m.

### b) Vegetation

As they are much higher than the border mountain range, the mountains from which the right bank torrents descend create a kind of barrier that the mosoons cannot cross. Storm clouds gather there and cause much precipitation which the left bank does not benefit from. The slopes on the right bank are more densely wooded because of greater rainfall (and vice a versa), more extended, and they also give rise more easily to convexion storms. It is not surprising therefore, that the vegetation there is denser and lush in certain lowland areas. Rainfall count and forest cover are thus interrelated in maintaining a regular water cycle.

On the right bank, one can find the same array of flora and crops from the semi-arid end of the main valley all the way to the alpine strata, as described in the 1985 report, but with this extra vigor and relative abundance resulting from the generous rainfall. The only noteworthy difference is the cultivation of rice, which is found as high as 1500 m, and is impossible to produce in Orouz Bagh and Shal because of the irregularity of their torrents.

### c) Animal husbandry

Once again, the composition of the livestock is basically identical to that of the left bank (88% goats, 8% sheep, 4% cattle). On the other hand, the importance of the herds in the local economy, as well as their size, make animal husbandry the main activity in this sector around which all else is structured.

### The Pathans (Pashtun)

They were the last to arrive, at the end of the last century. They brought Islam to the pagan Kafir population and took possession of the richest lands.

In the valley we are concerned with, they cultivate the mouth of its confluent with the Kunar (Nishagam is a Pashtun village). They go up nearly as far as where both torrents intersect.

The herdsmen take their animals to graze in the summer on nearby pastures at the higher limits of the forests. Their income however, comes mainly from wheat and the crops they grow in the lower valley (which at present makes them more vulnerable).

### The Nuristanis

They are the descendants of the Kafir, the original inhabitants of the area, now completely and sincerely moslem. They occupy the bottom of the valley, where the climate is good (it hardly ever freezes in Mared), but the slopes are steep and land is scarce. Animal husbandry is as important as agriculture, even more so at the present time.

It is in fact the flocks that have enabled this population to continue. The summer routes are several days away walking, very far into the massif (Porun region). It is not simply a question of bringing back the animals in good condition, along with the kids, but especially cheese for the winter (in Afghanistan, the Nuristanis alone make cheese, which is why the quality of the pasture is so important. It is also an occasion during these long journeys for them, on the fringes of Nuristani land, to reimmerse themselves in their environment and their own culture).

### The Gujurs

The Gujurs probably appeared in the Kunar around the XVIII century (thus, before the arrival of the Pathans). They did not come in great migratory waves, but rather little by little, in small groups, from Gujarat, a region in India. Great nomads at first, they are mostly herdsmen with vast transhumance routes that go from the high mountain pastures in the Hindu Kush to the plains of Jelalabad. Some have become sedentary, such as those in the highlands of Mared and Helgal and in almost all of the valleys studied. They have very little land, poorly exposed or at a very high altitude. Their winter dwellings are located higher up than the Nuristani's often in areas just barely inhabitable. Whether transient or sedentary, they are nonetheless owners of the largest herds in the region (sometimes as many as several hundred head per family). Disparaged and poorly thought of by the other ethnic groups, they have a bad reputation. Their summer grazing lands bring them into contact with both the Pathans in their wooded regions, and the Nuristanis in their remote mountain areas.

### d) Trading

The fact that supply areas are so remote, all in Pakistan, and the greater difficulties that exist to reach them than from the left bank, oblige the right bank to organise their trading procedures. For the inhabitant of Mared, besides the border mountain range barrier, there is the Kunar which

must be crossed (at very rare passages, with cables or rafts).

Whenever a peasant from the left bank wishes to make his purchases in Pakistan, he does so without consulting anyone. The trip is easy, as there is always a mountain pass a few hours from his house. The inhabitants of the high valleys on the right bank, on the other hand, prefer to organise a caravan of a few donkeys. The inhabitants of the village put in their orders with those going. The need to economise on efforts and journeys is a product of a society which is still structured and vigorous. Mared owes to this the fact it has maintained two boutiques. One can find tea there, embroidery cotton, matches, some medicine, tobacco, cloth .. etc.

Itineraries have been established, with all the necessary empirical and occasional preparations for a veritable route (cables stretched over the Kunar, building bridges, bandas turned into inns near the mountain passes, improvement of the paths in order to allow donkeys to pass ... etc.)

The local importance of these new paths was especially great during the last few months, as the border control by the Soviet-Afghans was stepped up along the lower Kunar and the region of Jelalabad. Most trading in both directions, between Pakistan and, respectively, the valleys of Pesh/Weygal, Darre Nour, Laghman and certain parts of Panshir, all transits through Mared and the Sao valley (left bank).

This is also the exodus route, but on the return it is the one that provides men and ammunition for the resistance. It is also where one can be hired to carry or convey goods, or open a "Chai Khane" (\*) for those travelling, or sell an animal in order to feed a team of transiting mujahedin.

Travelling traders also pass by. They sell goods, but they also buy : go betweeners prospecting the summer grazing lands for Pakistani butchers. As for venders of cloth, sewing goods, small tools ... etc., they often return home charged with local products they have traded or bought : dried morels, goatskins, wool, furs, cheese .... These traders are not very numerous in comparison to what they used to be : there are great risks along the uncertain paths (highway robbery). They maintain however, a flow of money which directly affects the population. They are

(\*) Chai Khane : teahouse, inn.

## I RECALLING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION

As the final objective is to help the population stay on their land by maintaining and if possible improving the quality and quantity of agricultural production, the objectives of the mission are basically the same as those outlined in the same chapter of the 1985 mission report, in short :

- Aid to agricultural production in every aspect (grain and vegetable) as well as to animal husbandry (bovine, small ruminants, pack animals, and fowl) by insisting here on veterinary prevention methods.

- On site training of peasants or livestock breeders in mastering the simplest techniques.

- Continuing to increase our understanding of the environment and the traditions so as to adapt our action to the reality and the circumstances of war.

completely unknown to the left bank, where the depopulation and the proximity to supply zones are unfavorable for them.

The go-betweenes, in particular, play an important role, as their arrival creates an occasion for sale, and incites locals to sell their excess of animals on site, which otherwise would constitute a problem : too much for family consumption (as all methods of meat conservation are unknown to them), or too risky to take to Pakistan to be sold, where, following all the uncertainties of the road, they would be at the mercy of the buyers.

Besides these direct or indirect relations with Pakistan, there are also those maintained with the hinterland as a result of transhumance. The trading done there provides the population with articles of traditional clothign, woven in the Weygal and Porun valleys.

In short, the inhabitants of Mared are more rooted than the Pashtun population which has been disoriented by the exodus and the attention of which is almost exclusively turned to Pakistan.

Thanks to its position between two worlds - the one which is left behind and the one where people remain - Mared is the result of both, while resolutely belonging to the second. The village (the whole valley to be more precise) maintains the necessary relations with Pakistan without breaking those it has with the hinterland. Situated on one of the main roads which is becoming one of the most important in the region, Mared benefits from the different economic possibilities emerging in either of these two zones.

Also, the Pakistani rupee is as widely used as the Afghan, which is not the case on the left bank. Another significant fact : the money circulating there is in the hands of heads of families, contrary to the Pashtun sector, where the bulk of it is in the hands of commanders.

#### e) Situation of the population in the Nishagam valleys.

The usual pattern of settlements of the population in the Kunar presents a more or less considerable agglomeration situated at the confluence of the main valley and one of the tributary torrents, from which the entire irrigation system in the area is established. It is also all along this torrent where one can find a string of hamlets and

isolated farms dependant on the main village (see 1985 report : example of Shal). The network of this valley, which opens up behind Nishagam, goes against this rule in so far as there are other villages there (including Mared).

### Nishagam

Situated on the Asmar-Barikot route, this major village is presently absolutely deserted. Its inhabitants were Pashtun and there were about 150 houses, all of which are now either destroyed or seriously damaged. A small group however, continues to cultivate the fields and lives most discreetly in the innermost reaches of the piedmont or in the narrow stretch of the mouth of the torrent. In this same area, the main markaz of local resistance have been set up .

Only exceptionally (as last year at the end of spring) does the enemy take this road in order to resupply the garnison in Barikot. The distance and the gaps in this path, caused by the resistance (collapsed path or landslides from the cliffs) protect Nishagam from the rounds made every now and then by the troops stationed in Asmar and Shagasaray. This explains how crops can be maintained so close to the Kunar whereas in areas close to governmental posts all land has been deserted.

### Sucay

In the southernmost valley (left branch of the Y), two and a half hours from Nishagam, Sucay occupies a rocky peak which overlooks the entire valley. Traces of fortification are still detectable at the summit of the peak and access to the village is by way of stairs with uneven and far apart steps that are sometimes corbelled over the gully. Although some Pashtun families have homes there, Sucay is basically Nuristani.

About thirty houses occupy all the available space at the summit of the headland. Scattered annex dwellings, built of the farms in the midst of the terraces or on the fringes of the crops and the scrub, are usually used during periods of agricultural work. In the winter, they house the part of the family especially in charge of the herds. At present thirty to forty of these bandas are inhabited permanently.

Its position as a look out post - corresponding to a defensive role dating back centuries - makes the village stand out and quite visible in line with the valley, and is thus vulnerable in the event of an air raid. From 1983 it has been bombarded, provoking the onset of an evacuation (as witnessed by the BIA mission in 1984). In the spring of 1985, during the major offensive, Sucay was once again hit and about ten houses destroyed. The village was then to empty out and the inhabitants occupied the peripheral dwellings. They continue however, to return to spend a day or longer periods there, so the village is not deserted.

Some families live there continuously. An inn functions, and the entire population gathers at the Mosque for prayer on Friday. Recently (July 1986) a medical outpost of the German Komittee was set up there, run by two Afghan nurses.

#### Mared

Forty five minutes from Sucay, upstream, Mared is built on a shelf on the southern exposure side of the mountain. Cultivation terraces surround it. Bandas up and downstream play an important role as in Sucay. Beyond the village, the valley, already quite narrow, becomes smaller and smaller as it climbs towards the forest. This is where the Gujurs live. The village of Mared has about ten houses. Added to this are the bandas, of which 10 to 15 houses are inhabited in the winter.

Despite its position on a meander and the proximity of the cliffs, which make it difficult to fly over at a low altitude, the village was bombarded in 1985. Five houses were destroyed. Some have been reconstructed on site, others a little out of the way. The goods and foodstuffs have been placed under security, but no house is uninhabited as in Sucay. The Mared population is Nuristani.

#### Helgal

Three and a half hours from Nishagam, Helgal was the only village in the northern valley (right branch of the Y). Nothing is left of it. Responding to the same defence criteria as in former times, it occupied a position identical to that of Sucay. The abundant use of wood in Nuristani construction resulted in the total destruction of the

village in 1985, smashed by fire bombs, to such an extent that not even traces of walls remain on the peak.

Its population, as considerable as in Sucay, is presently spread out along the valley, from the junction of both torrents up to the Gujur dwellings. The bulk however, is rehoused in bandas in the immediate surroundings of the old village.

#### The top of the valleys

Occupied mostly by the Gujurs, at the time of the mission these remote inhabited areas were almost empty : the inhabitants were in areas of transhumance. During its travels, the mission came across Gujur winter dwellings, basically those situated upstream from Mared. There are about fifty houses there. The same number holds true for the highlands of Helgal as well.

#### Sherassar

This is a small forest valley, a three hour walk from Mared. A main summer grazing site for the Pathans of Nishagam, a number of families spend the winter there also, as keepers of the site and because it offers refuge. Out of the hundred or so houses there, about twenty are occupied year round (but in this case only one family per house).

Population of Mared and its surroundings (census) :

Adults	Men	51
	Women	54
	TOTAL	105
Children (from 1 to 18)	Boys	106
	Girls	93
	TOTAL	209
TOTAL POPULATION		314

---

The following table concerning Nishagam and its surroundings is the result of cross-checking of information gathered on site and takes into account the men in the markaz of this sector. As the population is too transient, a systematic count was not made as was in Mared and its surroundings.

The considerable stability of the inhabitants on Nuristani and Gujur zones allowed us to apply to the whole area, the percentages that were obtained from the census taken in Mared. The few markaz located in this zone have too few men to really influence these statistics.

The small valley of Sherassar is to be included in the top of the valleys category because of the composition of the families that spend the winter there. As noted earlier however, the availability of dwellings during the winter season, and the prime reason for maintaining a population at this altitude (keepers of the site) result in the fact that there is usually only one family per occupied house.

In the villages the return for the winter of part of the family that was off with the herds, results in two families per house on the average (1 room per family).

Summary table of the population in the sector studied - estimates of the inhabitants.

	Inhabited houses in winter	Families	Adults	Children	Total	
NISHAGAM	-	-	-	-	-	PASHTUN
Surroundings	-	-	-	-	400	
SUCAY	8	16	35	70	105	NURIS- TANI
Surroundings	35	70	154	308	462	
MARED	10	20	44	88	132	
Surroundings	13	26	57	114	171	
HEL GAL	-	-	-	-	-	GUJUR
Surroundings	48	96	211	422	633	
MARED HIGHLANDS	50	100	220	440	660	
HEL GAL HIGHLANDS	50	100	220	440	660	
SHERASSAR	20	20	44	88	132	PASHTUN

TOTAL POPULATION : 3355

N.B. :

1) In the table estimating population, one can note, in relation to Mared, a difference of 11 people (3.6%) in comparison with the systematic counting done in that village (Table I). Adding this percentage as a correction to the results in the table above (or the equivalent of 120 people) gives us a total of 3475 people (or : 3500).

2) Nishagam and its surroundings, with about 150 houses and 30 isolated farms, could house a total population of 2400 inhabitants. The rest represents roughly 16.6%. Before the war, the overall population of the whole area must have been 5900 inhabitants.

#### f) Nutrition - Health

As for this chapter, see the 1985 report. The only differences worth mentioning concern, first of all, the consumption of cheese, a Nuristani specialty. This production is stored in special casing. Secondly, greater importance is given to the cultivation of (and consequently the consumption of) beans, resulting in a greater balance of non animal proteins per meal.

To a lesser extent, the vegetable garden, which is not as rare on this bank as it is traditionally in Shal and the left bank valleys, provides a considerable food supplement. Corn is nonetheless the staple grain.

Generally speaking, the food seems better and more appetizing. The vegetables prepared appear more often according to the season (onions, squash, tomatoes, okra). The better quality in cooking is no doubt due to the presence of women. Preserved from pillage by the owners who have remained on site, the fruit trees yield an interesting though uncertain production (plums, apples, quince, peaches). The most common fruits are nonetheless grapes and, especially walnuts which are traded in Pakistan.

Health problems are like those found in Shal. There is however, among the Nuristanis, an absence of basic hygiene, contrary to what the mission observed among the Pathans in the youngest (18 - 35) age groups, who wash quite willingly. The Nuristanis however, despite a abundance of water, seem to disregard this practise.

The installation in Sucay of a team of two nurses will no doubt result in a considerable improvement. Health care however, almost exclusively concerns men. Only in apparently extreme cases are women ever brought to these consultations. The fact that the two nurses are Afghans is to no advantage,

as the population has unfounded doubts concerning their true capabilities. The members of the mission were often compelled to deny treatment, which they had given in 1985, so as not to "compete" with the medical team in Sucay and thus oblige patients to consult them.

#### g) Political situation - resistance groups

The resistance is organised very differently in Pashtun areas affected by the exodus than it is in Nuristani or Gujur territory.

Throughout the lower valley and along the Kunar, the markaz are installed according to the usual patterns and spirit in the Kunar (1985 report). All tendencies are represented but there is less intermingling. Their positions, less directly threatened by the rounds made by the garnisons in Asmar or Shagassaray, have remained close to the path and in sight of the river. The leaders of these groups all claim to be under the authority of the major Pashtun commanders and receive their men from Pakistan for periods of two months.

In relation to the preceding year, it seems these groups (as those on the left bank) are better equipped in light and collective weapons. The use of Chinese made BM 12 rocket launchers is no longer exceptional and all these groups have received ammunition for them. The launchers are very commonly lent from one group to another and one party to another.

Very recently, mono-tube rocket launchers with a greater range (also Chinese made) are being used. They are still rare. Generally speaking, the impression received last year seems to be confirmed; that the groups from the two Hezb e Islami, Gol Bouddin and Khales, are the best equipped in weapons.

This long range weapon has enabled the mujahedin to increasingly harass the governmental bases with brief bombings not exceeding fifty projectiles. The only close attack we knew of, was carried out with relative success by commander Abdul Rauf Mollah against the lines on the outskirts of Asmar.

As in the preceding year, the team set out to maintain relations with all the tendencies represented. Requests for intervention (treatment for the animals, disinfection and elimination of parasites in the area, requests for vegetable seeds ...) came from almost all the commanders in the sector. Only the great distance of certain markaz kept us from responding to all requests.

The situation in zones where the population remained is entirely different.

First of all, there are no established markaz. The "commanders" in this sector - such as Nour Mohammad, our host in Mared - are first and foremost heads of extended families and peasants. They can however, in the event of an attack, mobilise their relatives and allies to support the forces in the markaz of the lower valley. They have no sophisticated or collective weapons, although some regularly request them.

Many of them follow the guidelines set by the top commanders and in doing so, express political adherence which remains very theoretical. They also follow those coming from Khans and large landowners, upon whose land they sometimes have a tenant farm and who are generally related to them.

So, in order to come into contact with one or another peasant-commander or shepherd-commander, certain letters of recommendation were very useful to us. These were addressed to a Gujur cheif or a Nuristani official by eminent persons staying in Pakistan and not having any direct relation with the military organisation of the Kunar.

It is interesting to note that all these eminent persons are of Pashtun origin.

## ANNEX III

Peshawar, September 24,  
1986

Grain production assistance program : ARG  
BIA  
OXFAM  
SCA

Summary of on site appraisal

Following the distribution phase of wheat and corn seeds in spring 1986 (until July for wheat), verification of the use of these seeds as well as an estimate of the obtained results were done in the field.

This study was carried out by the experts from the BIA alongside the specific activities of this association in the framework of its agricultural project. The present grain production assistance program is thus related and complementary to the BIA's agricultural project.

I Method and equipment used in the study

A Presence on the left bank of the Kunar of a team of two technicians in an affluent valley.

During their trips, the two experts were able to witness the planting of corn in the valleys of Dangam, Orouz Bagh, Shal, and on the Saogue plateau (Darre Bouna). In other words, in the three main valleys of the left bank concerned by the program. Their presence was to last from early to mid July.

B Presence on the right bank of a similar team.

As it was installed later, this team observed only the end of corn planting and followed the plant cycle of the crops until mid September.

This was the case in the valleys of Sucay-Hared and Helgal (valleys belonging to the Nishagam network) as well as on the land still cultivated along the Kunar (left bank) : Nishagam, Bargam, Haji Abad, and Jelala.

## II INITIAL INTERVENTION PLAN

The 1985 mission, among other results, enabled the inhabitants of the valleys where we remained the longest - Shal, Orouz Bagh, Sao Gue (referred to as Darre Bouna in the 1985 report) to understand what kind of aid we could provide. As for the population in the neighboring valleys, they were informed of an activity which was to be extended to the region and from which, later on, they would in turn benefit. They often expressed this wish and some requests came from regions far beyond the sector we are concerned with here (Pesh valley, Weygal).

As the project set out to cover a total of nine valleys adjacent to the Kunar (on either bank) (\*), it was agreed to install two teams of two technicians from as early as this year.

The first team, using the already known sector on the left bank around Shal as a springboard, would continue the work of the preceding year by providing innovations and initiatives likely to further the situation.

The second team, from a base on the right bank, would open a new field of activity in contact with inhabitants less visited in 1985.

### Duration of the mission

The mission was to last from April to September 1986.

### Welcoming group and political adherence

Mr. Walid Majrouh's group

National Liberation Front (Mujadedi).

### Composition of the teams and their location

Team n°1 : Left bank, Orouz Bagh valley

Bernard Juan : farmer, member of the 1985 mission.

Henry Lopez : specialised agricultural technician.

Team n°2 : Right bank, La Hossein valley

Alain de Bures : zootechnician, in charge of the 1985 and 1986 missions.

Dominique Paris : engineer at ISTOM (Institut Supérieur des Techniques d'Outre-Mer).

(\*) Left bank : Sao, Shal/Sao Gue, Orouz Bagh, Dangan.  
Right bank : Shigal, Nichagam (Helgal/Sucay/Mared),  
Darin, La Hossein, Shinkorak.

### C A travelling team of two Afghans

This team was sent to sectors far removed from the main activity sites of the BIA teams. Its itinerary was to last from mid August to mid September. It was headed by : Abdol Nahi, supervisor of the different stores during the period of distribution.

The work plan, prepared by the head of the BIA mission, included an itinerary of the valleys and sectors to be visited, as well as a list of the commanders and peasants to be inspected.

The determined spirit and scrupulous honesty of the head of this team, observed during the first part of the program, was a factor in deciding to let him gather complementary information during their trips.

N.B. For reasons related to the grain cultivation cycles, wheat is not considered here. In fact, as the wheat was not appropriately distributed in the Fall 1985, the seed stocks were handed out with the corn. This wheat will thus only be planted in October/November 1986 and harvested in May 1987.

## II Observations based on the gathered information

Out of the 98 lists of peasants provided by the commanders, 48 of them were inspected. Of those, 19 were totally unaccounted for in the field.

---

Which allows us to evaluate at 60.5% of the initial stock (30 tons) what actually reached the field, or 18,150 kg. And, consequently, at 39.5%, what was not planted or was misappropriated, or 11,850 kg.

---

Several different types of reasons were put forward to explain the non utilisation of these seeds :

A) Mistrust of certain peasants towards seeds suspected of not being adapted to a "cold" climate as in the Kunar, despite the given reassurances.

B) Fear of an impending offensive, resulting in a lack of labor and motivation to invest "precious" seeds in crops likely to be destroyed (regions situated between Shagasaray and Asmar).

C) Real offensive and commando attack (Dangam valley).

D) Certain populations being won over to the Kabul regime (Dangam valley).

E) Transportation difficulties in introducing the seed to the hinterland (especially for the peasants living on the right bank of the Kunar).

According to witness accounts, these reasons represent about 10% of the overall deficit (4% of which are attributed to road difficulties and their cost). It should be noted that the price of transporting a load of 5 kg (1 Afghan), from Binshey (Pakistan) to any site on the right bank went from 35 rupees to 150 rupees between the opening of the passes in the spring and mid August.

As for the remaining 29.5%, this was purely misappropriated, either to be resold, or to be planted on land belonging to family in Pakistan. The peasants appearing on the lists were never informed of the project.

This misappropriation is most often attributed to the person having signed the list (commander) or sometimes to whomever came to pick up the delivery of portions on behalf of others.

Note that in many areas, the corn cultivated in Pakistan in the highlands is no better than what can be found on the other side of the border.

### III Estimate of the results

The use of these seeds did not in any way modify traditional practices. We can thus directly appreciate the improvement resulting solely from the use of these seeds by comparing them with 100% local varieties, grown on the same soil and in the same climate.

Comparison of samples of ears taken from adjacent fields, or even from the same parcel :

	Size of the ear	Weight of the ear
Selected variety	15 to 20 cm	120 to 150 gr
Local variety	7 to 8 cm	45 to 50 gr
Difference ratio	2.5	3

\* the top 1/4 of the stalk has no seed

Calculated estimates of tonnage for upcoming harvest.

As it is not possible to weigh the crops obtained from a given surface, the following very theoretical calculations were made : Average number of kernels per selected ear : 330.

As planting is traditionally done very close together, a certain number of seedlings must be pulled out. Thus, for every plant conserved, four are eliminated.

Five seeds must be planted therefore, for every producing plant. So, for every seed planted, 66 are produced.

This ratio of 1 to 66, applied in an excessively simplistic way to the tonnage which was in fact supposedly planted, gives us  $18,150 \text{ kg} \times 66 = 1,197,900 \text{ kg}$  of expected harvest. The weight difference of the ears applied to the whole, results in the deduction that a production of 395 tons would have been obtained by using only the local seeds ( $1,197,900:3$ ). Selected seeds therefore, provide an increase in production of 790 tons.

By taking these calculations one step further, one can get an idea of what these quantities represent financially. Based on the price of the Afghan Man (5 kg) at the time of harvest (when the prices are at their lowest), that is 100 afghanis per Man;  $790,000 \text{ kg} : 5 = 158,000 \text{ Man} \times 100 = 15,800,000 \text{ afgh.}$  or 1,975,000 RS.

These calculations, excessively simplistic, do not take into account the uncertainties of production (disease, agricultural calamities, absurd cultivation methods ...). Also not taken into account however, is the fact that every stalk of corn can usually produce two ears.

We are not stating that these will definitely be the results. They nonetheless give an idea of what can be expected (after all the adjustments that such an action could undergo).

#### IV Conclusion

Selected corn seeds have all been obtained through hybridation. This necessarily results in a generation of these varieties when the subsequent seeds used are successively taken from the preceding harvest. The results of this process are only serious after two or three years. Resupplying with new seeds is then necessary. We must realize that considering the arable surfaces in the target zones, the 1986 program is far from having met all needs. This

is why we are in favor of repetition of this action for 1987 and for a tonnage yet to be evaluated. After this, the valleys having benefitted from these, will be able to use, from their own harvests, seeds that will still remain quite decent for two more years.

**ANNEX IV**

AGRICULTURAL PROJECT FOR  
THE KUNAR

PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE PARTNERS OF THE PROJECT

1 - OBJECTIVES AND MEANS

The fundamental aim of the BIA agricultural mission working in the Kunar is to maintain, improve, and develop agricultural and animal production in village communities still subsisting in this region so as to support the heroic struggle of the Afghan people for their liberation. As for the zones that have undergone depopulation as a result of the massive exodus of families towards Pakistan, the mission intends to help maintain agricultural activities that are still possible there.

To this end, the mission will develop two kinds of complementary and related actions :

Providing material means of production :  
selected seeds, tools, veterinary and phytosanitary products, etc...

An ongoing campaign of popularization, training, and education.

2 - THE PARTNERS

On the one hand, the BUREAU INTERNATIONAL AFGHANISTAN (B.I.A.), and on the other, FAZEL AKBAR and WALID MAJROUH as political and military officials of the resistance groups operating in the target zones (The Mahaz e Melli Party of PIR SAYED GAYLANI).

### 3 - RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS

- 3.1 The B.I.A. : The B.I.A. pledges to provide the means by which to carry out the project, that is, the experts under the authority of the head of the project, and the technical and financial means necessary for their work.

The head of the project, mandated by the B.I.A., is the only one authorized to negotiate with the Afghan partners and to decide, in agreement with them, on the conditions for carrying out the project.

. The experts pledge to scrupulously respect rules and customs of the local population.

. The B.I.A. pledges to cover the transportation expenses of the material for the mission up to the site of the project, as well as the round trip travelling expenses of the experts.

. The B.I.A. pledges to cover food expenses for the members of the mission as well as the Afghans in permanent charge of their safety.

#### 3.2 The Afghan partners pledge to :

- 3.2.1. - facilitate the work of the experts so that the program does, in fact, apply to the whole of the population favorable to the Jihad, regardless of their political affiliation.
- help the mission find those persons likely to be trained so as to guarantee for the future the development of a local infrastructure for the continuation of the program.
- 3.2.2. - ensure the safety of the members of the mission, which precisely implies :
  - assigning one armed man to each of the experts for the duration of the mission, as permanent bodyguards,
  - accompanying the experts during their trips from the work site to sites in Pakistan where they are safe, at least five mujahedin per expert plus an official. The emergency evacuation procedures (injury, accident, illness, etc.) are to be determined by WALID MAJROUH in agreement with the head of the team.

- 3.2.3. - As an agricultural development program is imperatively conditioned by the agricultural calendar, both partners of the project pledge to carry out the activities planned in the program, in keeping with their respective responsibilities, as soon as possible.
- 3.2.4. - The clauses of this protocol also apply to all individuals invited by the head of the mission in the framework of the program and in agreement with the Afghan partners.

- 4 - Should any one of the clauses specified in paragraph 3 of this protocol not be respected, the project itself would be called into question.

Peshawar,

For the B.I.A.  
Head of the Project  
Alain de BURES

For the Mahaz e Melli  
FAZEL AKBAR  
  
WALID MAJROUH

Original text written in French.

N.B. : 22/8/86

The different clauses can be modified with the agreement of the signing partners of this protocol, if it is deemed necessary.  
(Translated into Persian and signed on the top of the first page.)

## ANNEX V

## Prospects and proposals

for the extension of the assistance program for rural  
and agricultural economies to other provinces in Afghanistan

- 1 - 1984 : Preliminary trip to Afghanistan by a team from the  
BIA.  
Decision to operate in the Kunar.
- 1985 : Experimental mission in a Kunar valley (5 months).  
Development of an action and problems approach  
strategy.
- 1986 : Actual launching of the project (planned for 5 years).  
- Year 1 -

A presence of three years devoted to preparing and setting up an agricultural project. The novelty of this type of action in a war torn Afghanistan explains such a cautious approach and the delays in getting things under way.

- 2 - After reading the mission reports (1985, 1986), it is possible to understand the developments that the Kunar project offers for its own continuation and how the concerned populations may react.

The series of events which occurred in this region during these three years created a number of problems that the teams had to confront throughout their missions. This situation, on a very regional level, gives a small scale picture of what prevails throughout the whole country. Devastated territories; destroyed villages; fleeing population; political divisions and rivalries in the resistance; inter-party alliances; homogenous populations in the sanctuaries of the resistance; disappearance and reconstruction of trade routes; typical agricultural problems of a country at war; tribalism; emergence of new authorities; schooling; sanitary endeavors; autarky; market or dependence economy ... etc...

The ongoing updating of the project and its adaptation to circumstances have created promising results which prove that such action is in no way utopian.

For "year I", the agricultural program was reduced to a few areas of the project's overall targeted sector. It will thus, for "year II", broaden its range of activity within the considered perimeter so that after the planned five years, it will cover all of it.

If after these five years however, we reached this objective, the Kunar project would still fail in its essential mission if it remained the only one of its kind in Afghanistan.

The BIA has the intention of helping such projects emerge wherever possible; similar to the one for the Kunar in terms of principle objectives and methodological approach, but having their own specificity and composition in keeping with the target regions : resources and needs; social fabric and political context; ethnic groups and customs ...etc...

This intention of the BIA ensues from two main reasons.

First of all, the ever increasingly pressing requests from commanders in sometimes very remote regions. Besides their military concerns, they now have purely civilian preoccupations. These concerns are also those of the political staff in Peshawar who have continuously stressed this aspect of the war. It is quite natural for these representatives of entire valleys or agricultural sectors to come to us, seeking assistance which very often they cannot specify or formulate.

The second reason is of a more personal nature. It concerns each and every one of us faced with the sheer size of the needs. It incites us to give impetus to the experience already acquired and not be contented with the moral comfort ensuing from the single Kunar project.

Thus, the action we intend to carry out will be basically twofold :

- a) the continuation and follow-up of the projects
- b) the exploration of new sectors, with the prospect of evaluating and formulating new programs.

a) Continuation and follow-up of projects.

As the 1986 activities report is included here, we need not go into the development of a project as we see it, in both setting it up and its continuation. (see also the report concerning grain production assistance).

b) Evaluation and formulation of new programs.

Having already been contacted by different officials of the resistance (commanders, local political officials, party leaders), the BIA was called on to study a certain number of intervention proposals.

In every case, although they corresponded to real needs, these proposals could not give way to a coherent project, either because the information provided was too fragmented, concerning the general situation (political, demographic, economic), or because of the technical incompetence of our interlocutors with respect to the sectors of intervention (agriculture, animal husbandry, crafts ...)

This observation and the experience acquired from setting up the Kunar project convinced us that before launching any program whatsoever, an on site study is an absolute must.

It could be carried out during a brief stay in the designated area, in collaboration with those requesting and providing, whenever possible, veterinary medicine, phytosanitary products, or seeds, so as to establish contact with the population in the best conditions.

Only after the return of these missions (from 1 to 3 per year, according to circumstances) will those projects considered feasible be drafted.

Although the BIA is most interested in seeing a number of these projects be set up, it is clear that the BIA does not claim to single handedly take charge of all such programs. The list of feasible programs as well as the documentation gathered will be made available to French or foreign bodies interested in this type of action in Afghanistan. Of course, during these missions, any related information which could enable the establishment of an "integrated program" around agriculture (schooling, crafts, health ...) will not be disregarded.

### Criteria used in selecting the work sites

At first glance, it seemed logical that for the second year of presence in the Kunar, team n°1 should be installed in Shal, the valley that welcomed us the preceding year during the preparatory phase. This team would have thus benefitted from a well "cleared" area and continued the work begun in 1985.

This option no longer appeared wise after hearing about the developments on the left bank of the Kunar, following events which occurred in our absence.

Military activities and sporadic attacks carried out by the enemy during the 1985/86 winter, seriously modified the context, particularly along the border, on the left bank of the Kunar.

As for Shal, the former exodus which stripped it of a large part of the population (see 1985 report) worsened to the point that the remaining population no longer exceeded 10% of the original population (settled inhabitants). At the same time, and as a result, the political divisions in this valley, already quite complex the preceding year, were heightened by the "crystallisation" of armed groups less structured until then, as they were either intermingled with the population (the case of Hezb e Islami of Gol Baudin) or had very little representation (the case of Jamiat).

Moreover, the markaz situated at the bottom of the valley, where it meets the Kunar, were seriously neglected during the spring 1986 offensive. Under permanent threat afterwards of the possibility of commando raids, the officials decided to relocate them higher up, onto less exposed sites easier to defend. The concentration of these micro garnisons of different loyalties, thus increased in the relatively tiny area in the upper valley.

As a result, the Shal valley took on a more and more military aspect, to the detriment of purely rural activities. These have nonetheless not been abandoned, but are no longer the dominating concern of a fighting, temporary, and masculine majority.

Slightly further south, the Dangam valley underwent a similar development, which was even worse due to the presence of the Asmar base on its territory where the torrent and the Kunar meet. Militia forces were set up all around Asmar and linked to the Kabul regime which has held possession of these low lands for five years.

Thus, according to this "strategy", the BIA , from 1987 - while continuing to develop the activities it has in the Kunar - intends to carry out two exploratory missions (at least).

These missions are a response to invitations, some of which date back to 1985.

- 4 - The composition and organisation of our office in Paris, up until now, were sufficient for designing, setting up, and managing a single project in its preparatory and experimental years, 1984 and 1985.

In 1986 however, appeared the limits and lack of flexibility of our Parisian structures confronted with local problems (both in the field and in Pakistan), highlighted by the actual launching of the project and its implementation.

Considering that in 1987, the Kunar project, already under way, will require further infrastructure and follow up activities, but that we will also be starting the second part of our action, necessary for the creation and support of other projects, we feel it is absolutely indispensable to establish a permanent relay station in Peshawar. We would thus be as closely linked to our field of intervention as possible. This is what we intend to do during the first few months of 1987.

In so doing, a number of difficulties will be tackled, many of which were felt in 1986 :

#### In terms of relations

- with the political parties and their different leaders and bodies.
- with humanitarian organisations having their main headquarters (or the department in charge of aid to Afghanistan) situated in Pakistan, many of which are already or could become our partners.
- with the commanders and eminent persons coming from Afghanistan, and whose trip to Peshawar does not always coincide with our presence there. The orientation of the projects, the adaptation to the needs in the field, and to the circumstances of war, all depend on what they have to say.

### In terms of logistics

- waste of time and immobility in Pakistan for the teams having to gather and prepare the necessary material (the usual material not having been ordered in advance so as to have the stock available upon the arrival of the mission : veterinary medicine, phytosanitary products ...)
- preparing the conditions of the trip, passage, safety of the team members with the protecting commanders.
- housing for the team members.
- linkage between the site and Paris.

### In terms of training

- linguistic :  
Persian for the Western team members.  
French for the Afghan counterparts or assistants.
- technical :  
Afghan personnel recruited in Pakistan (ex: team to inspect the grain program, warehousemen, ...etc.)

## 5 - In summary :

After having launched the Kunar program, the BIA would fail in its endeavor if it limited its action only to maintaining this single project.

This is why, in wanting to expand the aid plan to rural economies to cover other provinces, it seems difficult to neglect any means that may facilitate this expansion. Prospection, establishment, maintenance, and follow up can only be designed in a logical and rational manner if done together with an on site operational representation. This would serve to coordinate the different activities of the BIA itself, and be a place of concertation, and information available to everyone and particularly to the partners associated to rural development projects in Afghanistan.

---

### Notice concerning the staff of this representation

Those responsible will not be limited to only maintaining the headquarters. They will also be in charge of on site prospecting in preparation for new projects. This would be during the initial phase, with the collaboration of the head of the Kunar project.

KUNAR AGRICULTURAL PROJECT (1986)FINANCING FOR 1986

	Subsidies granted	Subsidies paid out
OKFAM (GB)	100,000 FF	100,000
CCFD (F)	150,000 FF	150,000
Comité Genevois (CH)	50,000 FF	57,361.34
Terre des Hommes (F)	20,000 FF	20,000
Swedish Committee (S)	110,000 FF	110,000
Bureau International Afghanistan (F)		20,950
Comité d'Aide aux Agriculteurs du Kounar (F)	40,000 FF	13,170
Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (N)	50,000 FF	
Afghanistankomiteen i Norge (N)		93,340.53
NOVIB (NL)	100,000 FF	58,196.43
Solidarités Internationales	100,000 FF	100,000
Afghanistan Aid Foundation (NL) (Afghanistan Vrij)	50,000 FF	165,000
Comité Turin		1,000
Swiss Aid	100,000 FF	106,234.25
		<hr/> 995,252.55

Contribution requested from SILONG (French Overseas Service)  
for 1986 : 250,000 FF

Contribution requested from the E.E.C.  
for 1986 : 400,00 FF

Paris, October 17, 1986

Bank statement enclosed

## KUNAR MISSION 1986

## Budget

I - 1) <u>Investments</u> :		Forecast	Real expenses	
- Veterinary medicine and material		148,3000	85,940.40	
- Vegetable seeds		30,000	7,760	
- Other seeds				
- Road improvement .....			2,002	
- Phytosanitary material and tools (pickaxe, spade, shovel...)		50,000	59,894	
- Pack animals		25,000	17,600	
- Training of Afghan assistants .....			2,588	
Subtotal Post I		253,300	175,784.40	(1)
II - 1) <u>Operating costs</u> :				
- Personnel trips to Pakistan		10,000	7,778.40	
- Storage space rental in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, and housing		8,000	3,841.20	
- Accommodations in Pakistan		25,000	18,536.80	
- Pharmacy		5,000	2,986.40	
- Documents and maps		5,000	3,063	
- Paper supplies		3,000	4,032.10	
- Technical material (SERCI) .....			16,250.06	
- Telex, telephone .....			4,554.80	
		71,000	71,740.46	
2) <u>Transport of material and merchandise</u> :		50,000	28,482.20	
Subtotal Post II		121,000	100,222.66	(2)
-III - 1) <u>Personnel and technical assistance expenses</u> :				
Salaries : 3 European experts; salaries (6months)		143,000	152,324.82	
Head of the mission (7 months)		58,000	59,237.99	
Coordination at headquarters (1 year) .....			98,065.68	
Social coverage		149,000	155,502.50	
Special insurances		36,000	15,107	
Round trip Paris-Peshawar 5		76,250	48,000 (*)	
		462,250	528,237.99	

(\*) 4 trips made

-2) Research and preparation of agricultural and veterinary technical documents	11,200	10,500	
Subtotal Post III	473,450	538,737.99	(3)
IV - 1) <u>Project assessment</u>			
- Round trip Paris-Peshawar	15,250	12,000	
- Accommodations and travelling expenses, allowances	12,000	5,771.85	
- Preparation and typing of the report	5,000	5,000	
	32,250	22,771.85	
- 2) <u>Awareness campaign in France :</u> Photos, films, publications (1 audio-visual editing)	30,000	25,529.26	
Awareness campaign trip .....	.....	14,420.95	
	30,000	39,950.21	
Subtotal Post IV	62,250	62,722.06	(4)
Total 1	910,000	877,467.11	
Managing expenses	45,000	63,914.66	(5)
Miscellaneous and unexpected expenses, to be carried over if unused	45,000	42,455.90	(6)
FINAL TOTAL	1,000,000	983,837.67	

Situated between Shal and Dangam, the small Orouz Bagh valley surely presents a different aspect as its opening is extremely narrow and it is quite difficult to fly over. One party maintains a kind of hegemony there (the Hezb e Islami of Kholes), so the valley is spared of major political divisions. Also, as the population is less drawn to exodus, they have managed to maintain some coherence.

As Walid Majrouh has a base of some mujahedin in Orouz Bagh, team n°1 found the best conditions possible there for setting up, as well as a more central spot on the left bank sector.

For the same reasons that, out of caution, the markaz in Shal were relocated, Walid Majrouh was moving his Command Post to install it in La Hossein, leaving Shinkolak only the strict necessities. This new markaz was to be our base and relay station.

Services and assistance provided by the welcoming group  
According to verbal agreements with Walid Majrouh, he was to be in charge of having us accompanied from Peshawar to our work sites and back as well as facilitating the transport of material. Moreover, it was agreed that two or three youths (Mujahedin from his group or from "close" groups) would remain with us in order to protect us during the entire stay and also, in the framework of training, they would be our students.

#### Other previsions

The following were planned alongside the program and complementary to it :

- Actions relative to the grain production aid program ( OXFAM, SCA, ARC, BIA). In other words : to verify the delivery of the seeds distributed in Pakistan and estimate the results.

- Welcoming a journalist/film producer, Mr. Olivier Calmet, who was to do a film documentary on the agricultural situation in the Kunar and on the project, with the objective of making Europeans more aware of these problems.

- Welcoming Mr. Jean-Pierre Filiu, sent by the International Solidarities Organisation, so as to have an on site appreciation of the reality of the project.

- Adding Mr. Dominique Bos to team n°2, a member of the French NGO AFRANE, so as to be familiar with the

Afghan rural environment and with our work methods. The length of his stay was not decided beforehand, it was left up to the decision of Dominique Bos and the team.

### III TIME TABLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISSION

March 2	Arrival of the head of the mission in Peshawar
April 6	Arrival of the members of the mission in Peshawar
May 18	Departure of team n°1 for Orouz Bagh (arrival May 21)
June 5	Departure of team n°2 for Dangam
June 20	Arrival of team n°2 in Mared
July 11	Interruption of the mission on the right bank. Team n°1 returns to Pakistan
July 23	Team n°2 returns to Pakistan
August 7	The return of the mission to Mared
September 10	End of the mission for 1986
October 3	Return to France

#### 1) Period from March 2 to April 6

In 1985, the mission became aware of the alarming state of grain production in the Kunar. As a result of the war, in a direct manner : fires, destruction, exodus; but also indirect : impossibility of replenishing seed stocks. The latter explained the decline of genetic potential and the impoverishment of the yield. In order to somewhat remedy this, a campaign to distribute selected seeds was begun in Fall 1985 and resumed in Spring 1986.

The main goal of this campaign is to regenerate (for a while) the possibilities of on site supplying, by providing adequate seeds in sufficient quantity. In fact, it can be estimated that for the next three years, farmers will obtain from their own harvest (or that of a neighbor) seeds which are superior to those used until now. The impact on overall food production is easy to imagine (see annexed report estimating the results for 1986 corn harvest).

Once this distribution is completed, it will no longer be necessary to maintain the "seed" project as far as the Kunar is concerned (it could always be resumed later). The same is not true for the agricultural project which is our main concern here and which is a long term, more far reaching one.

KOUNAR MISSION

MISSION REPORT - November 1986

Afghanistan Aid Foundation (NL)  
(Afghanistan Vrij)

Afghanistankomiteen i Norge (N)

Bureau International Afghanistan (F)

Comité d'Aide aux Agriculteurs du Kounar (F)

Comité Genevois (CH)

Comité Turin (I)

CCFD (F)

NOVIB (NL)

OXFAM (GB)

SILONG (F)

Swedish Committee (S)

Swiss Aid (CH)

Terre des Hommes (F)

Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (N)

Translated from the French  
by José A. Duran

Mission Secretariat

Bureau International Afghanistan 24 rue de Chaligny 75012 Paris

Tel. (1) 43 07 15 67 - (1) 43 41 55 60